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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, when we speak of the law's recognition of the humanity or human nature
of a person, 2 we tend to think in terms of the recognition of rights that we believe all
human beings have, or should have. 3 From this perspective, when we speak of the
law's treatment of slaves in colonial and antebellum Virginia, we say that it failed to
recognize -slaves as human beings. That is true in the sense that the law failed to
recognize any rights of slaves, save their right to certain procedural protections in
criminal trials and their right to sue for their freedom.4 But there were other ways in
which the law recognized slaves as human beings, ways that did not interfere with
their owners' dominion over them as property or their economic value to their
owners.
In a number of cases, the courts recognized the human nature of the slave as
something that made him a unique and special form of property. As Judge Parker said
in the 1837 Virginia case Spencer v. Pilcher, "Our law in many instances recognizes
a distinction between property in things and persons."5 He went on to quote Chief
Justice Marshall as saying, "A slave has volition and feelings, which cannot be
disregarded or overlooked .... "6 But this recognition of the distinction between
slaves and other forms of property benefited the slaves for the most part only
incidentally. Instead, the recognition took forms that were meant to benefit their
masters: for example, by allowing lawful owners to claim particular slaves rather than
making them accept money damages; by requiring bailees to take special care of
slaves; by allowing masters to use slaves as agents; by failing to hold masters liable
for the willful wrongs of their slaves. Slavery in Virginia did not preclude the legal
recognition of slaves as human beings except in those respects that were economically
disadvantageous to the owner and incompatible with the assertion of his property
rights in the slave. The recognition of a broad basis of rights in the owner constituted
a rejection of all human rights that would have been important to the slave.
Orlando Patterson, in Slavery and Social Death, criticizes the traditional
distinction between person and property frequently made in discussions of the law of
slavery. 7 He points out that to say that a person is property is simply to say that others
have unspecified rights over him and that there are many such rights that people
2. See infra, text accompanying note 15, for a discussion of terminology.
3. For a statement of some of these rights, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(I11),
U.N. Doc. A1810 at 71 (1948). The resolution was passed by the United Nations in 1948 without a dissenting vote.
4. For a detailed analysis of the use of the law to perpetuate racial injustice as to both slaves and free blacks, see
A.L. HtGINBOTHAMt, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AIERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978).
5. Spencer v. Pilcher, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) at 583 (emphasis in original). Compare this with Blackstone's
pronouncement, "The objects of dominion or property are things, as contradistinguished from persons." 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16.
6. Spencer v. Pilcher, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) at 583 (quoting Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 150, 154 (1829)).
The case was brought against the owners of a steamboat as a common carrier of packaged goods to recover the value of
slaves lost because of negligence. The Supreme Court held that the carrier could not exercise the same degree of control
over slaves as over inanimate objects, and that they resembled passengers, rather than packaged goods. The law relating
to common carriers carrying packaged goods therefore did not apply. See Smith, Toward a Pure Legal Existence: Blacks
and the Constituiton, 30 How. L.J. 629 (1987).
7. See 0. PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 21 (1982).
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exercise over others who are not slaves. 8 Thus it is not enough to say that a person
is property; one must specify those kinds of property rights exercised with regard to
slaves that are not exercised with regard to other people. 9 The rights exercised over
others are, by convention, usually not called property rights, though they may not be
essentially different.' 0
Patterson's purpose is to develop a universal definition of slavery applicable to
all slave societies, and thus it is not important to his point to elaborate the distinctions
between property and nonproperty made in the law of any particular society. He is
interested in concepts useful for cross-cultural analysis. For our purposes, however,
it is very much to the point to know what pre-Civil War Virginians considered to be
the rights of property and their application to slaves. The importance of the distinction
is not diminished by the fact that there were rights over other people, such as wives,
that Virginians did not classify as property in their law."I
The fact that Virginia law viewed slaves as property (sometimes chattel,
sometimes real)' 2 meant that a particular set of rights, privileges, immunities, and
legal actions surrounded relations concerning them. The rights of property as they
applied to nonhumans were well established and provided a starting point for the law
of slavery. 13 Other human relationships that Patterson would say contained property
rights, such as those between husband and wife and between parent and child, were
not so classified by antebellum Virginians. This means that the starting point, the
causes of action, the legal conventions, the nature of the rights, and the presumptions
with regard to family members were all different from those with regard to slaves.
When we ask Patterson's question as to what kinds of rights were exercised over
slaves and were not exercised over other people in the civil law of Virginia, the short
answer is that once slaves were classified as property, 14 all of the rights contained in
the common law of property as it had developed over the centuries in England and
8. See id. This idea is developed in Kopytoff & Miers. Introduction, in SLAVERY IN AFRICA: HISTORICAL ND
ANTIIROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-81 (S. Miers & I. Kopytoff eds. 1977).
9. See 0. PATTERSON, supra note 7. at 21. Patterson credits Moses Finley with this idea. M.I. FINLEY, ANCIENT
SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY, 73-75 (1980).
10. Patterson gives as an example that an American husband is part of the property of his wife. "We never express
it this way, of course, for it sounds quite ghastly. Nevertheless. in actual and sociological terms a wife has all sorts of
claims, privileges, and powers in the person, labor power, and earnings of her husband-as every third husband in
America has discovered in the divorce courts. We need hardly add that husbands also have proprietary claims and powers
in their wives, powers that they all too frequently exercise with naked violence." 0. PATTERSON, supra note 7, at 22
(footnote omitted).
II. Later in the 19th century. this traditional line between property and non-property began to blur as the concept
of property was expanded to include rights and relations that had not been so classified earlier. See Vandervelde, The New
Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Propery. 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325
(1980).
12. "Chattel" is defined as "'[aln article of personal property, as opposed to real property. A thing personal and
movable. It may refer to animate as well as inanimate property." BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 215 (5th ed. 1979).
"Real property" refers to "[l]and. and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land. Also right
issuing out of. annexed to. and exercisable within or about land." Id. at 1096.
The difference in inheritance rights that widows had in real and chattel property, see 3 Hening 371 (1705). prompted
the legislature to declare slaves as real property during the first half of the 18th century. See 5 Hening 432 (1748); 4
Hening 222 (1727): 3 Hening 333 (1705).
13. See Morris. "'Villeinage. . . as it existed in England. reflects but little light on our subject:" The Problem of
the "Sources" of Southern Slave Law. 32 At. J. LEGAL HisT. 95. 105-07 (1988) (footnote in title omitted).
14. This process is described in a manuscript in progress by A. L. Higginbotham, Jr. and S. Ginsburg.
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Virginia for nonhuman property, land and chattel, came into play. These rights were
either adopted as they were or modified as necessary to protect the interests of the
master.
In this Article, we shall explore those contexts in the civil law of pre-Civil War
Virginia in which the humanity of the slave was recognized and those in which it was
denied. Generally speaking, it was recognized in those contexts in which it did not
challenge the property rights of the owner.
A note on terminology may be helpful here. We use the terms "humanity" and
"human nature" interchangeably in the Article. The Oxford English Dictionary's
lists two primary senses of the word "humanity," the first connected with "human"
and the second connected with "humane." Judges we quote sometimes used the term
in the second sense, as in the quotation immediately below that begins the next Part
of the Article. In our discussion, however, we use it in the first sense, which the
dictionary defines as the "quality or condition of being human, . . . the human
faculties or attributes collectively; human nature .... .. 16 In the title phrase,
"humanity" is meant to carry both of its primary meanings.
II. RECOGNITION OF THE SLAVE'S HUMANITY IN WAYS THAT DID NOT INVADE THE
RIGHTS OF PROPERTY
Slaves are not only property but they are rational beings, and entitled to the humanity of the
Court, when it can be exercised without invading the rights of property.' 7
The president of the court in the 1825 Virginia case of Allen v. Freeland'8 thus
set out the priorities of the law of a slave state in dealing with human property. The
court recognized the human nature of slave property and thought it was therefore
entitled to special consideration by the court. But this consideration was to be
extended only up to the point that it began to encroach on the property rights of the
owner. Then it was to stop short. The priorities were clear: property first, humanity
second.
A. The Owner's Entitlement to Specific Slaves Versus Monetary Compensation
One context in which the courts sometimes recognized explicitly the humanity
of the slave was that in which particular slaves were claimed under contract, will, or
execution of judgment. For example, when Foote sued Fitzhugh over the question of
the proper number of slaves to be included in a widow's dower, 19 the court said,
That an equal division of slaves, in number or value, is not always possible, and
sometimes improper, when it cannot be exactly done without separating infant children from
15. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933).
16. Id. at 445.
17. Allen v. Freeland. 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 170. 178 (1825).
18. Id.
19. Fitzhugh v. Foote, 7 Va. (3 Call) 13 (1801).
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their mothers, which humanity forbids, and will not be countenanced in a Court of Equity:
so, that a compensation for excess must, in such cases, be made and received in money...20
The property interests of the owners were well protected. The party who received less
than his full share of slaves was to receive the balance in money. Moreover, the
decision of the court further conserved slave property by ensuring that an infant was
kept where it was likely to get the best care, with its mother. Concerns of humanity
did not cause the courts routinely to forbid the separation either of husbands from
their wives and children or of children beyond infancy from their mothers. That
would have interfered too much with the "rights of property," with the ability of
slave owners freely to dispose of their property in the most profitable ways, as they
saw fit.
In Fitzhugh v. Foote,2' the court recognized the slaves' human nature in a way
that happened to benefit the slaves, namely the mother and infant. In another case,
in which the court was asked to assign particular slaves to one or another litigant,
there was no discernible benefit to the slaves whether the court decided for the
plaintiff or the defendant; both were strangers to the slaves. In Allen v. Freeland,22
quoted at the beginning of this Part, Allen had bought some slaves from Wright, but
Freeland wrongfully seized them in satisfaction of a debt owed him by Wright. The
question was whether Allen should recover the slaves themselves or money damages.
The court felt that money damages did not always fully compensate the owner
for the loss of a particular slave. "[Als regards the owner, [the slaves'] value is much
enhanced by the mutual attachment of master and slave; a value which cannot enter
into the calculation of damages by a jury. "23 In this case, however, Allen had bought
the slaves at a public sale and had had them only a short time. 24 There was "[n]o
sacrifice of feeling, no considerations of humanity . . . . These were not family
slaves, but strangers to the plaintiff .... "25 Allen had made no claim that they were
especially valuable for their "character, qualities, or skill in any trade or
handicraft.''26 He had not even paid for them yet. Therefore the court decided that
money damages were sufficient. 27
Here, the court indicated that it would have been willing to recognize the special
attachment of master and slave, had there been one, or the special value of the slave
to the master, had the master claimed it. The attachment was important to the court,
however, only because it increased the value of the slave to the master, not for any
benefit it conferred on the slave.
20 Id. at 17.
21. Id.
22. 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 170 (1825).
23. Id. at 178-79.
24. Id. at 173.
25, Id.
26. Id.
27. The court was convinced that the sellers were guilty of fraud in the sale and that Allen had acted in collusion
with them against Freeland. This may have influenced their decision against Allen. Id. at 176.
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We see most clearly that the slave's unique qualities as a human being were
appreciated only insofar as they affected his value to his master in the 1856 case
Summers v. Bean.28 In that case a widow sold her life interest in her late husband's
slaves. The wife of the buyer was the daughter of the late husband and was due to
infierit some of the slaves anyway on the widow's death. When the widow tried to
rescind the sale, the court ordered specific performance of the contract. Judge
Moncure discussed the unique quality of slaves that made delivery of the slaves,
rather than monetary damages, the appropriate remedy. The judge criticized and
rejected the only English case he found on point, Pearne v. Lisle,29 as failing to
appreciate that slaves were human beings. In Pearne, in refusing specific delivery of
slaves under a contract for hire in Antigua, Lord Hardwick had written:
As to the merits, a specific delivery of the Negroes is prayed; but that is not necessary, others
are as good; indeed in the case of a cherry-stone, very finely engraved, and likewise of an
extraordinary wrought piece of plate, for the specific delivery of which bills were brought
in this Court, they could not be satisfied any other way; their value arose on circumstances
peculiar to themselves; but in other things, as in diamonds, one may be as good as another.30
Judge Moncure said that Pearne could have no influence on the court's decision in
Summers because Lord Hardwick's reasoning was flawed. "His lordship rightly
considered negroes as property; but seems not to have considered them as human
beings, of greater peculiar value than 'a cherry-stone very finely engraved,' or 'an
extraordinary wrought piece of plate.' ",31
Moncure himself did not make that error. He realized that "[s]laves are not only
property but rational beings; and are generally acquired with reference to their moral
and intellectual qualities." 32 That realization did not, however, cause him to interfere
in any way with the rights of property exercised over slaves. It meant only that they
were a special kind of property, indeed, like finely wrought objects. It meant that
money damages were not an adequate remedy for their loss and that specific
performance of a contract could be ordered. It meant that slave property was to be
treated as land, rather than as chattel property, in a contract for sale. Moncure stated:
The party need not show that the land is of peculiar value, or that he could not be adequately
compensated in damages for the loss of it. It is enough that he so considers, and prefers to
have the land in specie. And that he does so is conclusively shown by his suit for specific
performance 3
The question before the court was whether slaves were, in their very nature,
property for which money damages would not provide an adequate remedy in the
event of a breach of a contract to sell and deliver them and whether specific delivery
of the slaves should therefore be ordered. In Allen v. Freeland, a quarter of a century
28. 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 404 (1856).
29. 27 Eng. Rep. 47 (1749). For a discussion of this case in the context of the development of English law
regarding slavery, see A.L. HIGGINBOTtIAM, JR., IN TtE MArrER OF COLOR 327-28 (1978).
30. Pearne, 27 Eng. Rep. at 48 (quoted in Summers, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) at 411).
31. summers, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) at 411.
32. Id. at 412-13.
33. Id. at 412.
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earlier, the court had required a special showing of value or attachment before it would
order delivery of a particular slave. 34 Now, in Summers v. Bean35 the court indicated
that it would do so routinely because of the special human nature of all slave property.
Judge Moncure criticized Lord Hardwick's insensitivity in failing to recognize the
human nature of slave property. His own recognition of it led to a more sympathetic
hearing of the would-be owner's claim for a particular human being as his slave. It
did not lead to a sympathetic hearing, or indeed any hearing at all, for the slave, whose
humanity was being valued above money by the owner and the court. The slave's
voice, and his interests, were considered completely irrelevant. The slave's status was
not improved by Judge Moncure. It was only the master who benefited.
B. Slaves as Agents
Owners regularly did business through slaves as their agents, and Virginia law
implicitly recognized this fact. A long line of statutes, starting in 1705, penalized
people who traded with slaves without the consent of the slaves' masters. 36 By
implication, a person could freely "buy, sell or receive any coin or commodity from
a slave" with the consent of the master. 37 Indeed, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held an owner liable for such routine dealings when he tried to deny the
agency. 38 This recognition of the human qualities of the slave facilitated the business
dealings of the owner and thus enhanced the value of the slave as property, but it
conferred no benefit on the slave. In Gore v. Buzzard,39 Gore had for some four or
five years sent raw hides to Buzzard's tannery and received back the tanned leather
entirely through the agency of his slaves. He had never sent a written order nor
spoken with Buzzard about the business; he had simply given verbal instructions to
the slaves, who passed them on. Following Buzzard's death, Gore asked for an
accounting of what he owed. He did not dispute the basic charges, but objected to
paying any interest. 4° The dispute grew into a lawsuit, in which Gore claimed that the
slaves were not his agents because he had not authorized them as required by
statute. 4' But the court would not allow Gore to deny the agency, which the facts
"furnish[ed] the strongest grounds to infer," simply because there was no written
authorization. 42 The statute merely required "the leave or consent" of the master, not
the written authorization, 43 and Gore's past dealings with Buzzard and with two other
tanners had provided ample evidence of that, 44 as had his failure to object to any
charges except the interest in the administrators' account.
34. 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 170 (1825).
35. 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 404 (1856).
36. See, e.g., 1840 Va. Acts 82 (1841); 1830 Va. Acts 130 (1831), 12 Hening 182 (1785); 5 Hening 547 (1748);
3 Hening 447 (1705).
37. 3 Hening 447. 451 (1705).
38. See Gore v. Buzzard. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 249 (1833).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 250-51.
41. See 1830 Va. Acts 130 (1831).
42. Gore, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) at 253-54.
43. Id. at 253.
44. Id. at 250.
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One statute explicitly recognized the agency of slaves who ran illegal ferry boats
for their masters. This 1840 act deemed ferriage paid to slaves who conducted such
boats to have been paid to their owners. 45 The reason behind this statute may be that
the owner of an illegal ferry tried to avoid prosecution by claiming that his slaves
were not his agents. If so, then the legislature, like the court in Gore, was unwilling
to let an owner who routinely did business through his slaves avoid liability by this
sleight of hand.
Slaves as agents were sometimes entrusted with delicate tasks on which human
life depended. In Randolph v. Hill,4 6 Hill's slave had been hired out to work in
Randolph's coal pits. One evening foul air was discovered in the pit where Hill's
slave worked, and the workers were taken out. The next morning the overseer sent
down one of Randolph's slaves to test the air. The slave was a foreman, one of the
most experienced workers at the pits, and the overseer said that he placed as much
confidence in the slave's report of safety as he would have in his own inspection. The
slave found the air safe, but in fact it was not, and the workers became ill. Hill's slave
died when he was overcome by the fumes, fell in some water in the pit, and
drowned. 47
Hill sued for the loss of his slave, and the trial court decided in his favor.
Randolph appealed on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. The
appeals court was evenly split, and the verdict was therefore affirmed. Judge
Brockenbrough had the following to say:
The jury might have been satisfied, that a single examination, even by a careful and
trustworthy person, with a single lamp, to ascertain whether it would be extinguished by
mephitic gas in a pit seventy feet deep, was not sufficient; that where human life was to be
risked, repeated and successive experiments should have been made .... The jury might
fairly have inferred . . . that the defendant and his agents were guilty of the negligence
charged.48
The agency of the slave foreman who tested the air was not questioned by either side,
nor was his competence. It was the overseer, who had sent him down only once, and
the owner, who had provided the coal pits with only one basket for escape, who were
judged at fault by the jury and by those appeals court judges who voted to uphold the
verdict. 49 There was no issue of agency, only one of negligence. The automatic
acceptance of the slave's agency was a recognition of his peculiarly human qualities
of expertise, judgment, and reliability, which allowed owners to undertake dangerous
and difficult work with a labor force composed mainly of slaves. Far from conflicting
with the owner's rights of property, such recognition of the humanity of the slave
allowed owners to use their human property in the most profitable ways.
45. 1840 Va. Acts 58 (1840).
46. 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 383 (1836).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 389-90.
49. Id. at 389-91. The other justices found that there was no fault and thought that there should have been no
recovery from Randolph. Id. at 391-92.
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The use of slaves as agents raises the question of respondeat superior.5 o Was the
owner held responsible for the negligence of the slave as agent? No Virginia cases
have been found on this issue, but we assume that he was.5' It is hard to imagine that
others would have been willing to deal with an owner through his slaves if they had
to assume any losses caused by the mistakes of the slaves. Willful misdeeds or
intentional wrongs of a slave acting as agent would have been outside the scope of the
agency and therefore not attributable to the master under ordinary agency law. 52
C. Baihnent: The Provision of Basic Necessities
Another context in which the humanity of the slave was recognized was that of
bailment. 53 Slaves held in jail had to be provided with the basic necessities required
to sustain life. One might argue that no recognition of the slave's human nature was
necessary for the courts to uphold such requirements; bailees would also be required
to support animal life in a case of bailment of a horse or of cattle. The court went
beyond that, however, in Dabney v. Taliaferro54 and suggested that the jailkeeper had
a responsibility to protect the slave as a human being.
Taliaferro's slave Bartlett, a runaway, had been captured and confined to jail
under the care of Sheriff Dabney's servant Thornton. Dabney failed to provide proper
heating and bed covering, as required by law. 55 As a result the slave became
"diseased and frost-bitten from cold, crippled and maimed,''56 and his value was
destroyed. The trial court awarded Taliaferro damages, but Dabney appealed on the
grounds that neither statute nor common law required that the jailkeeper provide a
runaway slave with blankets and fuel. 57
Judge Carr, for the court, roundly rejected the idea that a runaway slave was not
entitled to the same basic protection while in jail as were other human beings. He
went on to say that principles of the common law required such care of any prisoner:
For I cannot for a moment suppose, that by the law of the land, a human being may be
imprisoned in mid-winter, and yet the jailor not bound to provide him with covering or fire.
I should as soon think that he was not bound to furnish him food .... I speak now not under
the Act of Assembly, but on principles of the common law: and I am clearly of opinion, that
50. Under this principle of vicarious liability, a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant,
and as a principal for those of his agent. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
51. An exception to respondeat superior was the fellow servant rule. which first appeared in the United States in
the 1840s. It exempted an employer from liability in cases where one employee negligently injured a fellow servant.
Courts in other slave states came down on both sides of the question of whether to extend this new rule to injury to slaves.
See Note, Slavery and the Fellow Servant Rile: An Antebellum Dilemma, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1112 (1986) (authored by
Frederick Wertheim).
52. See infra Part II. section D. on civil liability for willful wrongs of the slave,
53. See Stanley. The Responsibilities a,,d Liabilities of the Bailee of Slave Labor in Virginia. 12 A. J. LEGAL HtsT.
336 (1968).
Bailment is the delivery of personal property for some particular use, or simply to hold, according to an agreement,
express or implied. After the purpose has been fulfilled, it is to be redelivered or reclaimed by the giver, or disposed of
according to his directions, See BLACK's Lss% DICTIONARY 129 (5th ed. 1979).
54, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 256 (1826).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 256-57.
57. Id. at 257-58,
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these principles do not warrant or excuse such omission and neglect. The genius of our law
is not so cruel and unfeelingA8
Here, again, the humanity of the slave was recognized by the law in a way that was
wholly consistent with the owner's property rights. To display its own humanity, the
court took advantage of the fact that protection of the slave did not "invade the rights
of property." They required consideration of the slave as a human being in a way that
they did not when the owner himself was the person failing to provide basic
necessities.5 9 To do that would have been to invade the owner's property rights, and
when legal recognition and protection of the slave's humanity conflicted with those
rights, the priorities of the law were clear.
Apart from bailment in jail, slave property might be in the care of another in a
conditional sale. That was the case in Williams v. Moore.60 Williams and Moore had
an oral agreement for the conditional sale of a slave woman, Peg, for 300 dollars. It
was agreed that if Moore did not like her, he could return her in three or four weeks.
While she was in Moore's possession, Peg lost several fingers and was otherwise
disabled by frostbite. Moore then decided he did not want her, returned her, and
cancelled the sale. Williams claimed that the damage was due to Moore's negligence,
but, further, that Moore was liable whether or not negligent. The trial court dis-
agreed. The judge instructed the jury that a bailee was not responsible for damage
caused by accident unless the contract so specified, but that he was responsible if the
slave were injured because of his neglect, even if it were only slight neglect. The
appeals court agreed with the main proposition, but reduced the standard to ordinary
care-"such care as any man of common prudence, and capable of governing a
family, takes of his own concerns." 6 1
This duty of care, applied to slaves and others alike, could be claimed only by
owners for their human property, never by the human property itself. The failure to
provide humane treatment to the slave was a breach of a right of the owner, but not
a breach of the human rights of the slave, for he was recognized as having no such
rights. The humanity of the slave, requiring that he be treated with the care due other
humans and not like other forms of property, became part of the owner's property
rights. Far from invading the rights of property, it protected and enhanced them. The
primary beneficiary of the recognition of the slave's humanity was the owner.
Occasionally the slave also benefited, but only incidentally.
58. Id. at 261. This passage seems to suggest a duty of care toward the slave as a human being. If so, it was never
one that the slave could claim for himself; only the owner could claim it for the slave as his property. And the owner
himself had no such duty to his slave.
The court opened the way for damages to be awarded in Dabney. but the way in which they did it reveals that the
judges' professed concern for the slave as a human being was merely rhetorical. Nineteenth century American courts
recognized pain and suffering in consequence of a wrongful injury as a proper element of damages in tort cases. see. e.g..
Cooper v. Mullins, 30 Ga. 146, 152 (1860); Mason v. Inhabitants of Ellsworth. 32 Me. 271. 273 (1850). but in this case
the slave, who endured the frostbite and the pain and suffering, could receive nothing. The master, who lived in a warm
house and had no frostbite, received the compensation.
59. A manuscript in progress by A.L. Higginbotham, Jr. and A. Jacobs discusses the negligible protection provided
to the slave against abuses by his owner in the criminal law.
60. 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 310 (1812).
61. Id. at 313. The case was remanded to the lower court with directions that the jury be instructed to apply the
standard of ordinary care in deciding the case. Id.
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D. Civil Liability for the Willful Wrongs of Slaves
Were owners ever held liable for the willful wrongs of their slaves? Morris
62
notes that in deciding whether to hold masters liable for the willful wrongs of their
slaves, Southern jurists had several bodies of law on which they could draw. They
could analogize slaves to cattle, in which case a strict liability could be imposed on
the master under common law. They could see slaves as domestic animals with
vicious habits, in which case the liability was less than strict; the owner had to have
known of the bad character of the particular animal. Finally, they could treat slaves
as servants in which case the master would not be held liable for the intentional
wrongs of the slave unless the master had authorized them. 63 In all the slave states
Morris surveyed, the last alternative was chosen and the victims of slave wrongs were
therefore left without compensation.
Morris found no clear cases on this point for Virginia. Nor did we, but the
evidence we did find supports his conclusions. The only appellate level case we have
that raises this issue does not specify whether the Negro in question is slave or free.
In Barrett v. Gibson, a storage house for tobacco was "maliciously burnt by a Negro
Woman of the Defts [defendant's]."64 She was convicted and executed, but that did
not help Barrett, who had lost his tobacco in the fire. He sued Gibson, the owner of
the storage house, but failed to collect "because the Master is not Chargeable for the
wilful wrong of his Servant." 65
The jury was unresponsive to Barrett's claim for compensation on the ground
that Gibson could have saved some of the tobacco if he had tried to do so. They did
find that some of the tobacco could have been saved, but concluded that Barrett
should pay for the tobacco only if he were held liable for the willful burning of the
storage house.66
We suspect that the "Negro Woman" was a slave because it was not specified
that she was free and because she was referred to as a Negro woman "of the
[defendant's]," which sounds like she was his property. There is no specific mention
of slave status in the case, and all the case law cited refers to the master-servant
relationship. We take this to mean not that she was a servant, but rather that, like
other Southern jurists, the Virginia judges in this case had decided to treat slaves as
servants in the question of the master's liability for the willful wrongs of his slaves. 6
7
Assuming that the Negro woman was a slave, the recognition of her as a human
being, who was for these purposes in the same position as servant, served to protect
her master. If owners were held civilly liable for the intentional wrongs of their
slaves, it would have put enormous power in the hands of any slaves who were angry
and desperate enough to risk their own lives to harm their masters. The defendant in
62. Morris, "As If the Injury Was Effected by the Natural Elements ofAir, or Fire": Slave Wrongs and the Liability
of Masters. 16 L. & Soc'y REv. 569 (1981-82).
63. See id. at 577-78.
64, I Va. (Sir J. Rand.) R70 (1731).
65. Id. at R72.
66. Id. at R70.
67. See generally Morris. supra note 62.
19891
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Barrett would not only have lost his storage house, but he would also have had to bear
the losses of all who had stored their goods with him. If the law had granted the power
to slaves to make their masters liable by reason of the slaves' negligence or willful
misconduct, it is questionable whether many of them would have been aware of these
common law implications. However, the irony and the danger would not have been
lost on lawyers and judges, themselves slave owners.
The slaves' exercise of their free will often made it difficult for slave owners
fully to exercise what they considered to be their rights over their human property. If
that property were also capable of bringing untold civil liability to their owners, the
owners may well have viewed a law conferring such a capability as incompatible with
the exercise of their property rights. 68 As it was, the recognition of the slave's human
nature in this context served to bring him under servant law, thus protecting the owner
from civil liability. No one could force a slave to accept entirely his owner's
dominion over him as property, but the law could at least shield owners from some
of the consequences of the slave's refusal to accept it. It did so by recognizing him
as a human being responsible for his own willful misdeed. 69
Several statutes illustrate the protection the law afforded the slave owner when
his property was bent on doing wrong. These statutes sometimes required owners to
compensate private individuals, but for the most part only when the owners knew or
should have known of the wrongs their slaves were committing. In those cases,
owners were held responsible for losses to others occasioned by their own negligent
supervision of their slaves.
The statutes concerning water mills are an example. 70 The statutes set up rules
"for prevention of abuses, by evil-minded covetous, and exacting millers." 7 Every
miller not grinding according to turn, not grinding the grain sufficiently, or charging
more than one eighth part of wheat or one sixth part of Indian corn had to pay fifteen
shillings to the party injured for each offense.72 For violations in which the miller was
a slave or imported servant, the owner was not liable for the first two offenses.
Instead, the slave or servant miller received thirty lashes for the first offense, and
forty for the second. The third time a slave or servant violated the act, the owner had
to pay for that and all subsequent violations by the same miller. 73 In this context, the
law recognized the human nature of the slave by failing to hold the owner responsible
for his slaves' wrongs in exactly the same way that it failed to hold him responsible
68. See id. at 584-93. Morris notes that several Southern judges in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana
advanced the idea that if owners were to bear the costs of accidents caused by their slaves, it could lead to economic ruin.
Morris also raises the possibility that the master's liability was limited because his power over the slave was limited, but
he found only one jurist who adopted that position. That was in a Missouri case. See id. at 589.
69. The slave was, of course, held personally liable for his criminal wrongs. See, e.g., In re Elvira, 57 Va. (16
Gratt.) 561 (1865). See generally A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 293-313 (1930) (discussing criminal
liability of slaves).
70. 1806 Va. Acts 12 (1807); 6 Hening 55 (1748); 3 Hening 401 (1705).
71. 3 Hening 401, 402 (1705).
72. Id. at 402-03.
73. Id. at 403-04.
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for his servants' wrongs. 74 The fact that the slave was also the owner's property was
not relevant in such a situation.
Other statutes made slave owners civilly liable for damage caused by their slaves
if there was not adequate supervision of the slaves' living quarters. A 1692 act
provided that "where it shall happen that any damage shall be hereafter committed
by any negro or other slave living at a quarter, where there is noe christian overseer,
the same damage shall be recompenced by the owner of such slave to the party
injured." 75 The provision was reenacted in 1705.76 The fact that the owner was
explicitly made liable for any damage caused by his slaves when they were
inadequately supervised suggests that he would not have been held civilly liable for
their wrongs when supervision met the usual standard.
In an act to provide against misuse of a bridge over the Rivanna River, owners
were not held liable for their slaves' improper use of the bridge. 77 The 1834 act fined
persons who "willfully, wantonly and maliciously ride on or drive horse, cattle,
mules or other things over Walker Timberlake's bridge ... faster than in a walk." 78
Half the fine was to go to the Commonwealth and half to the bridge owner. Slaves
were punished by whipping, unless their owners paid the fine. 79
The statute against stealing hogs, passed in 1705, shielded owners only partially
from civil liability for their slaves' wrongs.80 Free persons convicted a second time
of stealing hogs had to pay 400 pounds of tobacco, half to the owner of the hog and
half to the informer.8' In the case of indentured servants, the master paid the entire
fine and the servant reimbursed him by additional service at the rate of 150 pounds
of tobacco per month. If the hog-stealer were a slave, his owner had to pay 200
pounds of tobacco to the hog's owner, but nothing to an informer.8 2
Why was a slave owner required to compensate the owner of a hog the first time
his slave stole, yet not made responsible for his slave miller's wrongs until the third
offense? It may be because of the direct benefit his slaves received from the theft -
a substantial amount of meat. The benefits to the slave and his owner are less clear
in the case of the miller's violation of the regulations. This explanation would account
for the fact that the slave owner had to pay only the hog owner, and not an informer.
There were a number of other statutes that fined owners for their slaves'
misdemeanors only if the owners directed the slaves to do wrong, consented to their
74. The acts regulating milling applied to imported servants as well as slaves. See 1806 Va. Acts 12 (1807); 6
Hening 55. 59 (1748); 3 Hening 401. 403 (1705).
75. 3 Hening 102. 103 (1692).
76. 3 Hening 447, 460 (1705).
77. 1833 Va. Acts 170 (1834).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 171.
80. 3 Hening 276 (1705).
81. Id. at 277. There w'ere significant differences in the treatment of free whites and nonwhites who violated the
act. For a first offense whites had the choice of 25 lashes or 20 pounds current money. Negroes. Mulattoes, and Indians
received 39 lashes. This was in addition to the tobacco they had to pay to the owner and the informer. Id. at 276.
82. id. at 277. There could be no penalty of additional service for slaves, who served for life, but they did receive
more lashes than did white servants. Id. at 276.
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actions, or knew of the actions.8 3 These statutes provided no civil damages and
therefore are not considered here.
Apart from the master's liability for losses the slave willfully caused to others,
there was also the question of who should bear the loss when the slave's negligence
caused damage to himself. Usually there was no candidate save the owner, but when
the slave was hired out, the question sometimes arose as to whether the owner or the
hirer should have to bear the loss.
In Harvey v. Skipwith,84 the court held a hirer liable for injury to a slave when
he used the slave contrary to contract, notwithstanding that the slave might have been
guilty of negligence that caused the injury. Skipwith had hired out a slave, Jefferson,
to Harvey on the express condition that Jefferson would not be used in blasting. When
Jefferson was blinded in a blasting accident, Harvey claimed that the overseer had
done the blasting himself and had instructed Jefferson to stand back, but that the slave
had come up behind the overseer, unbeknownst to him. The court held Harvey liable
anyway because he had used Jefferson in blasting in violation of the contract. The
court said that if the slave were injured while employed contrary to the contract in a
dangerous way, "the hirer is liable for the damage, notwithstanding the slave may
have been negligent or imprudent or have acted in disobedience of the orders of the
hirer in respect to such employment, and notwithstanding such negligence or
imprudence or disobedience may have been the proximate cause of the injury.' 85
The court, in acknowledging that the slave might have been negligent and that
his negligence might have been the proximate cause of an injury, recognized some
peculiarly human qualities in the slave. These were human qualities with particular
consequences in tort law. The case, however, was decided on the basis of a
contractual agreement. Slaves as human beings might be capable of negligence, but
no one could recover from a slave, so the question then became which master was to
bear the loss. The masters had an agreement as to how the human property was to be
used, and that agreement superseded any willful actions on the part of the slave who
caused the damage. If the hirer had used the slave as he had promised, neither the
slave's negligence nor the injury would have occurred.
Thus, the humanity of the slave and his volitional capacity to be negligent in
ways that injured himself and therefore damaged his owner's property were not
allowed to supersede contractual relations and responsibilities concerning that
property. As usual, the legal recognition of the slave as property precluded his
recognition as a human being when the two led to contradictory results.
Generally speaking, the hirer had to bear the loss when, during the term of hire,
the slave's own actions deprived the hirer of his services. But if the slave died a
natural death, then the owner had to bear the loss. This can be seen in George v.
Elliott,86 when a slave who had been hired for a year died after five months. George,
the hirer, claimed credit on his bond from the time the slave died until the end of the
83. See, e.g., 1829 Va. Acts 23 (1830); 1814 Va. Acts 94 (1814); 12 Hening 174 (1785); 3 Hening 462 (1705).
84. 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 393 (1863).
85. Id. at 405.
86. 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 5 (1806).
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year. The court noted that if a slave became ill or ran away during a term of hire, the
hirer still had to pay. If, however, the slave died through no fault of the hirer, the loss
fell on the owner, on whom it would have fallen had the slave not been hired. George
thus got credit on his bond, for the court held, "it would be unreasonable to allow the
owner hire - HIRE! - for what? - for a dead negro!"
87
E. Summary
In all of the contexts discussed above in which the court gave recognition to the
human nature of the slave, there was no invasion of what the law held to be the
owner's rights of property. The rule of law supported and sometimes enhanced the
rights of the owner. In the law's concern to maximize the owner's property interests,
the slave might, in some rare instances, benefit also, as in Fitzhugh v. Foote,88 when
the court spoke out against the separation of a mother and infant, but the primary
context was that of insuring the rights of the owner. The slave as such had no rights.
Yet the court talked of the slave's humanity and the importance of human feelings.
It evidently did not strike the judges as odd or hypocritical that the humanity of the
slave was recognized only in the sense that it made the slave a special form of
property, requiring special care and capable of special attachments. The recognition
of the human nature of a person did not inevitably entail, as it does for us today, the
granting of personal rights. That would have interfered with the rights of property,
and property rights came first where slaves were concerned.
Ill. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE SLAVE'S HUMANITY IN WAYS THAT WOULD INVADE
THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY
[P]ersons in the status of slavery have no civil rights, save that of suing for freedom when
entitled to it: they can make no contracts, nor acquire any property: they can obtain no
redress by action against their masters or others, for personal injuries: they are in truth
civiliter mortuus, and without protection of public authority, except that of the criminal
law.89
The law's failure to recognize the full human nature of the slave consisted of its
failure to recognize the slave as having any civil rights. Any denial to a slave of rights
enjoyed by free Negroes and Mulattoes of the same age and sex meant that it was the
slave status per se that was the reason for the failure to give full legal recognition to
his humanity. The law regularly denied such rights when they would have interfered
with the exercise of the owner's property rights in his slave.
A. The Incapacity of Slaves to Make Contracts
One of the rights that most free adults enjoyed in pre-Civil War Virginia was the
right to make a contract. Married women were excepted, as were children and those
87. Id. at 6.
88. 7 Va. (3 Call) 13 (1801).
89, Peter v. Hargrave. 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12, 17 (1848).
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adults who were mentally incompetent. Indentured servants could make contracts
with their masters, but only under court supervision, presumably to ensure that the
contract represented the free will of the servant. 90 The relationship between master
and indentured servant put in question the free will of the servant in making a
contract. The relationship between master and slave made the exercise of such free
will legally impossible. John Howard, the counsel for the appellants in Bailey v.
Poindexter's Ex'r9 t argued,
Nor, indeed, from the relation between master and slave, can any contract, by or with a
slave, acting for himself, have any possible legal validity whatever. For the parties to every
valid contract must be free agents; they must have an "agreeing mind;" but as the will of
the slave is under subjection to that of the master, the requisite independence and freedom
to make the contract or not, does not exist. 92
Beyond the fact that the slave was in a subordinate position, Howard cited a second
and to him a stronger reason for the slave's incapacity: "[S]ince the slave himself,
and all the acquisitions of the slave, belong to the master, a contract by the master
with his slave, is but a contract by the master with his own property concerning his
own property."- 93
The courts consistently refused to enforce agreements made by slaves acting on
their own, and not as agents of their masters. Slaves sometimes made agreements
with their masters to buy themselves or their relatives, but such contracts had no legal
standing and would not be enforced by a court of law or equity. 94
In Sawney v. Carter,95 Sawney, a "colored man," sued Carter to recover his
freedom on the grounds that he had repaid his purchase price. He claimed that when
Carter had bought him, they had agreed that when Sawney paid back his price, he
90. 3 Hening 447. 450 (1705).
91. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858).
92. Id. at 141.
93. Id. Howard went on to say:
Nor is it any answer to say that, with the consent of the owner, the slave is competent to contract with third
persons: for the slave in such cases is but the agent of the master, whose will and control appear in every such
permitted act of the slave. The acts of the slave, indeed, are but the acts of the master, if authorized or ratified
by him: otherwise, they are of no legal validity or effect.
id.
94. Although they had no legally enforceable rights, slaves did make contracts with their owners and the owners
did sometimes honor them. In 1792, the legislature passed an act emancipating "a negro woman named Rose and her three
children'" and acknowledged that she had bought herself and her children from their owners. 1792 Va. Acts I 11 (1792).
This was in spite of the fact that the law did not recognize her capacity to make a contract or to own property. In the eyes
of the law, the money with which she paid her master belonged to him anyway. But since no one challenged the contract
or its execution, the court acknowledged the custom of letting slaves buy their freedom or the freedom of their family
members. The preamble to the statute read.
Whereas it is represented that a negro woman named Rose, did on the twenty-ninth day of December, one
thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, pay to her then master and owner, Rice Parker, of the county of
Caroline, the sum of fifty pounds in full for her future services and labor; and did also on the sixth day of March,
one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine, pay to the said Rice Parker the sum of twenty-five pounds for the
future services and labor of two of her children named Judy and Katy; and did on the first day of March, one
thousand seven hundred and ninety-two, pay to George Pickett. the sum of fifty pounds in full for the future
services and labor of her son David; and the said Rose, alias Rosetta Hailstock, hath made application to this
Assembly to pass an act emancipating not only herself, but also her said children David, Judy, and Katy which
it is judged right to do ....
95. 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 173 (1828).
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should go free. Judge Coalter, writing for the court, found that while proof of the
contract was unclear, there was "perhaps proof enough in the record, of his master
having received some property, to wit, a waggon and three horses, [from the slave]
... to send the case to an account." 96 That is, there was some evidence of a transfer
of property to sustain the claim of the contract if it could be proved and if such a
contract could be enforced in equity.
The court decided that a contract of freedom could not be enforced in a court of
equity. There were no cases supporting the jurisdiction of the court and one case
against jurisdiction, which Judge Coalter had found to be "a very strong case for the
[slave]" in terms of fairness and justice, presumably even stronger than that of
Saivney.97
In that case, Rose v. Halcall,98 John Rose claimed his freedom on the grounds
that he had repaid his purchase price to Duncan Rose, who had bought him in an
estate sale. When he was alive, Duncan Rose had told the same story, admitted that
John was free, and paid him wages. When Duncan died intestate, having failed to
emancipate John Rose formally by will or deed, the estate claimed John as a slave,
and he sued for his freedom. The court found that John had not been emancipated in
any of the ways prescribed by law and denied his plea. The administrator of Duncan
Rose's estate, Haxall, whom John Rose sued, was charged with conserving the assets
of the estate and could not emancipate estate property on his own initiative. But
Haxall said he was not hostile to John Rose's claim of freedom and merely wanted
to know whether the Court of Equity would recognize it, under either the contract or
any other mode of emancipation established by law. The court refused to grant John
Rose his freedom. 99
In Stevenson v. Singleton, 00 decided a year after Sawney v. Carter, the court
disposed of the case in a short paragraph, citing Sawney v. Carter as precedent and
phrasing the holding of Sawney as, "[Ilt is not competent to a court of chancery to
enforce a contract between master and slave, even although [sic] the contract should
be fully complied with on the part of the slave."' 0'
There is the notion that courts of equity are to do equity and they have a broader
latitude in assuring a fair and just result than do courts of law.' 0 2 Despite their
purpose and their broad powers, courts of equity, like those in Rose and Sawney, did
not feel compelled to render justice to a slave suing for his freedom under a contract,
even when they recognized the outcome as harsh and when the administrator of the
estate to which the slave belonged did not object. In declaring itself not to have
jurisdiction, the court was in effect saying that the law's recognition of a slave as
property precluded the court's consideration of justice or fairness for him.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 174.
98. This was apparently an unreported case; thus we have only the summary of the case given in Sawney.
99. Sawnev. 27 Va. (6 Rand.) at 174-75.
100. 23 Va. (I Leigh) 79 (1829).
101. Id. at 81.
102. See. e.g.. W. DEFuLNAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQurry 1-10 (2d ed. 1956).
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A court of equity would have refused to enforce contracts made by minors or by
persons who were mentally incompetent in order to protect those persons. When it
refused to enforce contracts made by slaves, it was not motivated by any concern with
the slaves' welfare. There was not even the claim or fiction that it was. Rather, the
court's concern was that the rights of the master over his human property should not
be 'disturbed. This can be clearly seen in the fact that courts did enforce contracts
made by slaves as agents for their masters. ' 03 It was only contracts made by slaves
acting on their own behalf that the courts refused to enforce.
The incapacity of a slave to make a contract also precluded his right to contract
a marriage, as noted by the court in Brewer v. Harris.'4 Retha Harris was a free
woman of color "whose husband was a slave."t 0 5 She had three daughters whom the
County Court had bound out as apprentices until the age of seventeen because they
were bastards. 0 6 Harris challenged the indenture on a number of grounds but did not
challenge that her daughters were bastards. That was the basis on which the County
Court had acted to apprentice them. Judge Baldwin, in ruling that the County Court
had acted within its jurisdiction, noted the fact that "their father being a slave, [he
was] therefore incapable of contracting matrimony in the mode prescribed by our
law." 10 7 Marriage involved the partners in rights and duties under English law that
would have interfered with the rights that the law recognized an owner had over his
slave property. 0 8
B. The Incapacity of Slaves to Own Property
The first formal pronouncement that slaves could not hold property came in
1692, in "An act for the more speedy prosecution of slaves committing Capitall
Crimes." 109 There, the legislature decreed:
103. See supra Part II, Section B on slaves as agents.
104. 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 285 (1848).
105. Id.
106. Judge Baldwin quoted Section 35 of Act 2, Rev. Code, ch. 239, which provided that "every bastard child may
be bound apprentice, by the overseers of the poor ... ; every male, until he attains 21 years. and every female until she
attains 18 years, and no longer;. ... Brewer, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) at 300. The court noted that the number of years the
daughters were bound out was under the statutory limit. Id. at 297.
107. Brewer, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) at 303. Judge Brooke went even further to speculate whether the children of all free
blacks were not bastards. "Whether the children of free persons of colour are all to be construed bastards, it is not material
to decide in this ease. There is no form of marriage, as regards them, pointed out by our statutes." Id. at 307. By denying
slaves the ability to marry, the whites could be assured that their children were all either slaves (if children of slave
women) or free bastards (if children of free women and slave men) who might be bound out as apprentices.
If other judges had agreed with Brooke that no free colored could marry, then all of their children could have been
apprenticed as bastards also. It would have been a convenient way for whites to dispose of free black children and to
increase the labor supply. The reasoning has a Machiavellian twist to it: first make it impossible for blacks to marry and
then penalize their children because they are bastards. The "act for declaring what shall be a lawful marriage." did not,
in fact, contain any rcial restrictions. 10 Hening 861 (1780). Brooke's judicial racism had no statutory basis.
Slaves sometimes did go through a ceremony of marriage, but the court would not honor it, as they show in the
Brewver case.
108. In a Maryland case, this point was made explicit for female slaves:
When the laws of England, and the essential and inseparable rights annexed by them to the civil institution of
marriage are considered, either the master's property must give way for the support of the marriage of a female
slave, or her marriage must be deemed invalid; in order to preserve her master's property.
Opinion of Daniel Dulany, I H. & McH. 559, 562 (Md. 1767).
109. 3 Hening 102 (1692).
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That all horses, cattle and hoggs marked of any negro or other slaves marke, or by any slave
kept, and which shall not by the last day of December next, be converted by the owner of
such slave to the use and marke of the said owner, shall be forfeited to the use of the poore
of the parish wherein such horse, beast or hogg shall be kept, seizable by the church wardens
thereof." 10
This does not appear to have stopped the practice of slaves keeping livestock on
their own, for the legislature addressed the question again in 1705, and this time the
lawmakers did not allow the slave owners a grace period during which to convert the
animals to their own use. I I In the same year, they declared that indentured servants
were allowed to hold their own property."t 2
Property of slaves other than livestock was not mentioned in these statutes, nor
was the fact that slaves could not legally own any property, though the latter did
appear as dicta in opinions such as Peter v. Hargrave.13 One mid-19th century
statute providing for the voluntary enslavement of a group of slaves who had been
manumitted and given property by their master's will explicitly vested the property
of the slaves in their new master. "14 Slaves who were freed after 1806 faced a hard
choice. They had to leave Virginia and their families and friends there within a year,
or face re-enslavement." 5 Some stayed illegally and faced possible enslavement if
caught; others went through a formal process of voluntary enslavement, which
allowed them to choose their masters."t 6 The freed slaves of Archibald T. Gordon
chose the latter option. The legislature approved and declared that the estate to which
the former slaves were entitled under Gordon's will would become vested in their
new master, "and he shall have the right to ask, demand, sue for and recover such
estate for his own use." 17 While Virginia law never recognized any right of the slave
to own property, custom did, and on occasion the court referred to such customary
rights. In Sawney v. Carter, I I" Judge Coalter said, "[T]here is perhaps proof enough
in the record, of his master having received some property, to wit, a waggon and
three horses, which the pauper claimed as his own, and the proceeds of his earnings
by waggoning, to send this case to an account." 19 Thus, although it was illegal for
the slave to hold livestock 20 or to hire himself out for wages, 2' the judge implied
that the court might have been willing to look at such evidence if it had been
competent to enforce a contract between a slave and his master.
110. Id. at 103.
111. See 3 Hening 447, 459-60 (1705).
112. See id. at 450. The statute stated,
[lif any servants shall, at any time bring in goods or money, or during the time of their service, by gift, or any
other lawful ways or means, come to have any goods or money, they shall enjoy the propriety thereof, and have
the sole use and benefit thereof to themselves.
Id.
113, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12 (1848). See supra text accompanying note 89.
114. See 1861 Va. Acts 251, 252 (1861).
115. See 1805 Va. Acts 35. 36 (1806).
116, This option was first given by statute in 1856. See 1855 Va. Acts 37 (1856).
117. 1861 Va. Acts 251, 252 (1861).
118. 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 173 (1828). See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
119. Id.
120. See 3 Hening 447. 459-60 (1705); 3 Hening 102, 103 (1692).
121. See, e.g.. 1807 Va. Acts 22 (1808); 1800 Va. Acts 37 (1801); 11 Hening 59 (1782).
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C. The Inability of Former Slaves to Collect Damages for Illegal
Detention in Slavery
One of the rights of a free person in Virginia was that he was entitled to damages
when he had suffered a loss because of the wrongful actions of others. Slaves were
not. A master could sue for damage to his human property, but one who was legally
a slave could not sue on his own behalf. He did not have the necessary legal
personality.
But what of persons who were illegally held as slaves, those who were entitled
to their freedom and eventually won it through the courts? Could they sue to recover
money they had earned for their masters while they were illegally detained?
Until 1850, the courts routinely denied damages to litigants who won their
freedom, although they had allowed damages in colonial times for apprentices kept
beyond their contracts, even black apprentices. 122 In one case, M'Michen v. Amos, 123
the appeals court allowed to stand a jury award of "one cent damages" 124 to someone
held wrongfully in slavery. But when more than a token amount was involved, the
court refused, even when they recognized, as in Paup v. Mingo,125 that to do so went
contrary to a sense of justice.
In that case, William Walker, who died in 1789, had stated in his will that he
wanted his slaves to be emancipated after his debts were paid. Lawsuits by his
creditors prolonged the settling of the estate, and some fifteen years after Walker's
death the slaves had not yet been freed. Instead, they had been hired out to create a
fund to pay the debts of the estate, so that they would not have to be sold to satisfy
the creditors. In 1809, the slaves were freed by a decree of the chancellor on the
grounds that ample reserve existed in the fund to pay the debts. When the estate debts
were finally settled in 1827, a surplus remained in the fund, and the former slaves
petitioned for it. 126
The chancellor in equity granted them the profits, but the appeals court reversed.
Two of the three judges acknowledged that the outcome was a harsh one, but claimed
that the point of law was so well settled that it could not be overturned. In fact it could
have been, but the court declined to use its broad powers in equity to render justice
to former slaves. Judge Carr lamented,
There is much in this argument, which addresses itself to our sense of justice, and to our
feelings; but unfortunately for them, the point has been irrevocably settled against them. ...
There have been numerous cases of recovery of freedom by persons illegally held in
bondage; and in many of them, the violation of freedom has been gross and palpable, and
the public feeling strongly on their side; yet in not one single case, have damages for the
detention been given. 27
122. West v. Negro Mary, Mcllwaine 372, 373 (Va. 1674); Moore v. Light, Mellwaine 354 (Va. 1673).
123, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 134 (1826).
124. Id.
125. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 175 (1833).
126. Id. at 175-80.
127. Id. at 190.
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Judge Tucker, who concurred, expressed no regret for the ruling. 12 He agreed
that the law could not be changed, but even if it could, he doubted the wisdom of
doing so.
[T]here are many grave considerations which ought to be weighed .... [T]he slave, in his
birth and his infancy, has been a burden, and ... if the master could have foreseen his
emancipation and his demand for profits, he might have been altogether averse from
incurring such a charge. 129
The most comprehensive justification for refusing to allow recovery of damages
or inesne profits by those illegally held in slavery was given in Peter v. Hargrave. t30
In that case, the slaves were to have been set free by their master's will. When they
were not, they sued for their freedom and claimed the profits of their labors since the
death of their master on the grounds that "the defendants had detained them in
slavery with a full knowledge of their right to be free; and had defended and
protracted the suit upon pretexts that were entirely frivolous and groundless."' 3'
The court rejected their claim and, far from lamenting their inability to collect
damages, as did Judge Carr in Paup, found their claim entirely inappropriate. Judge
Baldwin wrote for the court,
Persons in the status of slavery are not entitled to any of the remedies of freemen: They are
slaves whatever may be their right to freedom, and have no civil privileges or immunities.
They are subject to the control, dominion and discipline of their masters, and must look to
them for maintenance and protection .... In truth, while they remain in the status of slavery
they have no personal rights, and of course no remedy by action for redress of injuries. The
only suit they can bring is for the recovery of freedom; and even during its pendency they
still continue slaves, in the care, service and custody of their masters, without any restraint
upon the authority and power of the latter, except such as is necessary for a fair trial and
adjudication of the controversy.1-12
Judge Baldwin's determination to keep slaves as slaves, even when they were
entitled to their freedom, sprang from two sources, both of which were elaborated in
the opinion. The first was a concern for the economic well-being of the slave owners:
A rule giving inesne profits to slaves, after a recovery of freedom, would operate harshly and
often ruinously in regard to the master .... The owner of slaves ... is usually condemned
to a constant ... burden of care and expenditure. It seldom happens that more than a small
proportion of them are capable of productive labour; while provision must be made for the
food, clothing and shelter of all; for the helplessness of infancy, the decrepitude of age, the
infirmities of disease; to say nothing of the heedlessness, slothfulness and waste natural to
persons in their condition. Hence it is that the scantiness of net profit from slave labour has
128. Id. at 197 (Tucker. J.. concurring). Judge Tucker's position here is consistent with the one he took some years
earlier in Hudgins v. Wright, I I Va. (I Hen. & M.) 133 (1806). In that case he disagreed with the lower court chancellor,
who had ruled that freedom was the birthright of everyone under the Virginia Bill of Rights, and who said that the burden
of proof was therefore always on the would-be owner in freedom suits. Tucker said the Bill of Rights was not meant to
be "'a side wind to overturn the rights of property." and held that the burden of proof was to be on the one claiming
freedom, unless he or she looked white. Id. at 136, 140.
129. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) at 199.
130. 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12 (1848). See supra text accompanying note 89.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 13-14.
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become proverbial, and that nothing is more common than an actual loss, or a benefit merely
in the slow increase of capital from propagation. 33
The second source was a conviction that because of Negro inferiority, slavery
conferred a benefit rather than a hardship on the slaves themselves. Therefore, the
apparent harshness of the ruling was illusory:
In point of abstract justice, it may seem reasonable enough that slaves recovering their
freedom should be entitled to an account of mesne profits: but a slight examination will serve
to shew that the question is anomalous in its character, and arises out of a peculiar
organization of society, affecting the condition and rights of persons in a way unknown to
the principles of the common law. 3
Judge Baldwin went on to describe the "peculiar organization of society" that
affected people in ways unknown to the common law. He saw slavery as a suitable
status for an inferior population, for a "servile race." 135
Slavery is with us an institution founded upon a distinction of races, one of which is subject
to the control and domination of the other. The servile race, from colour, and other physical
traits, carry with them indefinitely the marks of inferiority and degradation; and even when
relieved from bondage can never aspire to association and citizenship with the white
population. Freedom to them is a benefit rather in name than in fact; and in truth, upon the
whole their condition is not thereby improved in respectability, comfort or happiness.... 136
He concluded that in most instances "no practical injustice will be done them, by
striking an even balance of profit and loss between them and their former
masters." 137
In 1849, the legislature enacted a law allowing mesne profits to go to former
slaves. 138 The law stated:
When slaves are emancipated by will, the net proceeds of the aggregate of their hires and
profits, with which the personal representative of the testator is chargeable, or so much
thereof as may not be required for the payment of debts, shall, unless inconsistent with the
manifest intention of the testator, belong to the persons so emancipated, and be apportioned
among them as a court of equity having cognizance of the case may deem just. 39
This statute applied only to slaves manumitted by will, not to those who claimed
their freedom on other grounds, so it may be said to have been carrying out the will
of the testator rather than offering a boon to individuals whom a slaveowner had
wrongly considered to be his property. Nevertheless, it softened the harshness and
injustice that some judges felt when denying former slaves such profits. It was not,
133. Id. at 19.
134. Id. at 21-22.
135. When Judge Baldwin wrote, in the mid-nineteenth century, slavery was under increasingly strong attack from
abolitionists. In addition, theories of scientific racism were being elaborated, both in the United States and in Europe. See
W. STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE tN AMitcA 1815-59 (1960).
136. 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) at 22.
137. Id.
138. Code of 1849, ch. 106, § 8, p. 465 (quoted in Osborne v. Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 117. 117 (1855)). The
statute was enacted in 1849 and took effect in 1850. Osborne v. Taylor, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) at 126.
139. Osborne, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) at 117 (quoting Code of 1849, ch. 106, § 8, p. 465).
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however, a right recognized as belonging to slaves but, rather, a right of presump-
tively free persons who had not yet received final recognition of their free status.
D. The Incapacity of Slaves to Sue Except for Their Freedom
There was no statute saying that slaves could not sue, except for their freedom.
We simply find no other kind of case in which a slave (or alleged slave) was the
plaintiff. In addition, a number of cases offer as dicta statements that slaves cannot
sue, as in Peter v. Hargrave, where Judge Baldwin said of persons in the status of
slavery, "[T]hey have no personal rights, and of course no remedy by action for
redress of injuries."t4o
Why then, were slaves allowed to sue for their freedom? We believe that it was
on the assumption that they were not really slaves at all but, rather, free persons who
were illegally held in slavery. The only way to make it possible for such persons to
recover their freedom was to allow them to sue for it.
Even so, when the legislature acted in 1795 to regularize the procedure in
freedom suits, it did so not to facilitate such suits, but to protect the masters. The
statute was to consolidate several acts concerning slaves, free Negroes, and
Mulattoes, and the preamble read:
Whereas great and alarming mischiefs have arisen in other states of this Union, and are
likely to arise in this by voluntary associations of individuals, who, under cover of effecting
that justice towards persons unwarrantably held in slavery, which the sovereignty and duty
of society alone ought to afford; have in many instances been the means of depriving masters
of their property in slaves; and in others occasioned them heavy expences in tedious and
unfounded law suits: To the end that a plain and easy mode may be pointed out by law for
the recovery of freedom where it is unjustly and illegally denied, and that all such practices
may in future be made useless and punished. 24
The act next set out a procedure for suing and provided for punishing anyone helping
in a suit that failed.' 42 Later, the procedure for freedom suits was re-enacted, with
minor changes, as one of a set of statutes helping poor persons in their suits. An 1818
act "providing a method to help and speed Poor Persons in their Suits" 143 contained
the procedure for someone who wished to sue for his freedom.
The person was to go to the county court or to a magistrate, who then summoned
the owner to appear and answer the complaint. The owner had to give a bond equal
to the value of the slave, assuring that he would let the slave appear at the next court
session to pursue his freedom suit. If the owner did not give bond, the petitioner was
held by the court and the master was charged for his keep.'n
140. 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12. 14 (1848).
141. 1795 Va. Acts 16 (1795).
142. Id. at § Il1.
143. 1817 Va. Acts71 (1818). A 1786statuteto helppoorpersons in theirsuitsdid not mention persons in the status
of slaves but merely provided for writs and counsel without cost to the plaintiff. 12 Hening 356 (1786).
144. 1817 Va. Acts 71 (181).
1989]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The protection this provision provided for the petitioner indicates the seriousness
with which the legislature took such claims. Slaves were property and could expect
very little help or protection from the law as persons; what protection they did receive
was by way of protecting their master's valuable property. Free persons were another
matter entirely. They had a right to their freedom, and if any of them had been
illegally enslaved, a gross injustice had been done, and prompt action had to be
available to correct it. The only practicable measure was to allow those in the position
of slaves into court to sue for their freedom.145
Thus, the slave's right to sue for his freedom was not the right of a slave at all,
but the right of a presumptively free person who was illegally held in slavery. People
who were truly and legally slaves had no such right, but the only way to prove that
they were legally enslaved was for a freedom suit to be decided against them.
E. Summary
The failure of the law to recognize any rights of the slave sprang from its view
of the slave as property. A free Virginian had clear and inviolable rights with regard
to his property, and once the slave was slotted into that legal category any rights given
to him were a violation of the property rights of his owner. That is not to say that the
courts or the legislature could not have created a legal position for slaves as inferior
human beings rather than as a special form of property, but they did not. The slave
became property, and the courts consistently refused to give legal recognition to his
humanity in any way that would have interfered with his owner's rights of property
in him. This refusal included the denial of a slave's right to make a contract, his right
to own property, his right to sue, and even his right to collect damages if he had been
illegally held in slavery. He could sue for his freedom, not as a slave but, rather, as
a presumptively free person who had been illegally enslaved. In short, the slave had
no personal rights at all.
IV. THE RECOGNITION OF No STATUS BETWEEN SLAVE AND FREE
The status of a free person and that of a slave were antithetical in the eyes of the
law. One kind of person could hold property and was entitled to the protection of the
law in so doing; the other was property and had no rights that would interfere with
his owner's dominion over him. One could sue and be sued; the other could not. One
had the right to personal liberty; the other had none. One had the right of security and
protection of his person; the other had not. A free person had all these rights and a
slave had none. No middle ground was recognized. There was no status between
slave and free.
The transformation of a slave into a free person marked such a dramatic change
that Judge Carr, in Fulton v. Shaw' 46 described it as a rebirth: "[Wihen she is made
145. There were statutes against illegally enslaving free persons, but these statutes would have been hard to enforce
without allowing such persons to speak out and seek redress. See 5 Hening 547, 548 (1748); 6 Hening 356. 357 (1753);
12 Hening 531 (1787); 1847 Va. Acts 95, 97 (1847).
146. 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 597 (1827).
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free, her condition is wholly changed. She becomes a new creature; receives a new
existence; all property in her is utterly extinguished; her rights and condition are just
the same as if she had been born free." 147 The case was one in which a slave owner,
John Fitzgerald, freed his slave Mary Shaw and tried to reserve a right to her future
children as his slaves. The court would not tolerate such an arrangement. Judge Carr
said, "A free mother cannot have children who are slaves. Such a birth would be
monstrous both in the eye of reason and of law." 148 The reservation of right was
declared invalid, and Mary and her children born after the deed was executed were,
simply, free persons.
In Fulton, the court's refusal to contemplate any status between slave and free
worked to the advantage of the former slave and her children. In a number of
mid-nineteenth century cases, similar refusals worked against the slaves with a
terrible irony. A number of testators, aware of the statutes that would force
emancipated slaves to leave the Commonwealth within a year,' 49 tried to offer their
slaves a choice of slavery in Virginia or freedom elsewhere. If the owner knew that
a slave wished to remain in Virginia, he sometimes tried to make it possible for the
slave to choose his master. Such bequests often resulted in a denial of freedom by the
courts.
In one such case, Absalom Flowers, in his will, directed "that my negro man
James have his choice to live with either of my children or grandchildren, whichever
he may select; but he may have the privilege to change his home, if he think proper,
if not well treated, and may live where he prefers." 50 James chose to live with
Flowers' granddaughter, Lucy Adams, and did so for three years, when other
relatives claimed that the clause in the will disposing of him was invalid. They said
that James should be considered as intestate property, that he should be sold, and that
the money should be distributed among Flowers' heirs. '5'
The court found that Flowers' intention to provide a comfortable and agreeable
home for James was "very plain" but that he had
attempted to confer upon him rights and privileges which are wholly inconsistent with a state
of slavery .... The sole object of the testator seems to have been to confer these privileges
on the slave, and to leave him in a condition between slavery and freedom - a condition
unknown to our laws and against its policy. -152
In trying to arrange for James' greatest comfort, Flowers had unwittingly left an
opening, which some of Flowers' relatives used to claim a piece of James' value for
themselves, thus entirely defeating the testator's intent. Flowers' solicitousness for
James' comfort resulted in James being sold-the last thing the testator would have
wished.
During the nineteenth century, the courts developed an increasingly hard line on
147. Id. at 599.
148. Id.
149. 1805 Va. Acts 35, 36 (1806).
150. Adams v. Gilliam. I Patton & Heath 161 (Va. Spec. Ct. App. 1855).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 164.
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the question of a slave's capacity to make a choice under a will. In 1799, the court
had carried out testator John Pleasants'
desire ... respecting my poor slaves, [that] all of them as I shall die possessed with shall
be free if they choose it when they arrive to the age of thirty years, and the laws of the land
will admit them to be set free, without their being transported out of the country. 153
No question had arisen as to the slave's legal capacity to make the choice. Similarly,
in Elder v. Elder 54 the court had honored the testator's wish to allow his slaves to
choose freedom in Liberia or slavery under his brother in Virginia.
By mid-century, however, the court of appeals would no longer allow slaves to
have the choice of slavery in Virginia or freedom elsewhere. In Osborne v. Taylor
55
a testator declared that his slaves were to be manumitted after the death of a Mrs.
Johnson, for whose benefit they were to serve as slaves during her life. In a separate
clause, he further stipulated that should any of them prefer to remain in Virginia, they
could choose their own masters, serve during the life of the person chosen, and then
have another opportunity to choose between slavery and freedom. The court declared
invalid the clause that allowed the slaves to remain in Virginia, "in a condition
intermediate between slavery and freedom," that is, with the future right to opt twice
for their freedom.' 56 It did, however, recognize the separate and earlier clause
granting them freedom on the death of Mrs. Johnson. The slaves were freed; they
could not choose to remain slaves. ' 57
Three years later, the court refused to free the slaves of John L. Poindexter,
when he did not in his will separate the grant of freedom from the wish that his slaves
be allowed to choose freedom or slavery. ' 58 The court had allowed Pleasants' slaves
to do so in 1799, but it would not in 1858. Poindexter's will stated, "The negroes
loaned my wife, at her death I wish to have their choice of being emancipated or sold
publicly."' 159 Judge Daniel thought that "[t]he whole tenor of his will shows that he
intended manumission of the slaves to depend on the performance by them of the
precedent condition of electing to be emancipated."' 6 0 He then asked, "Is the
condition one which the slaves have the legal capacity to perform?"' 6'
The question seems misconceived, for a condition precedent does not necessar-
ily imply a legal capacity. As Judge Moncure noted in his dissent,
The fallacy of the argument ... consists in supposing that to make such an election would
be to exercise a civil right or capacity .... It is said that a slave emancipated by an election
given him by his master, would become free by his own act, and not by the act of his master.
But this is not so. A slave can become free only by the act of his master; and the act must
153. Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 319 (1798).
154. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 271 (1833).
155. 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 117 (1855).
156. Id. at 128.
157. Slaves could, as free persons, voluntarily enslave themselves by statute to a master of their own choosing after
1856. 1856 Va. Acts 37 (1856).
158. Bailey v. Poindexter's Ex'r, 55 Va. (14 Gran.) 132 (1858).
159. Id. at 186.
160. Id. at 189.
161. 1d. at 190.
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be done in a certain prescribed mode. When the act has been done in that mode, it may be
made to depend on the willingness of the slave as well as upon any other condition.' 62
The majority of the court was unswayed by this argument and held that by the will
the testator had "endeavored to clothe his slaves with the uncontrollable and
irrevocable power of determining for themselves whether they shall be
manumitted." 163 That endeavor, in turn, attempted to create a status between slavery
and freedom and was therefore invalid. The slaves were to remain slaves. With regard
to prior cases that had allowed slaves to choose, Pleasants v. Pleasants and Elder v.
Elder, Judge Daniel said that the slave's legal capacity to choose had simply not been
raised in those cases.' 64
In Williams v. Coalter,165 decided later that same year, the court went even
further in restricting bequests of freedom in which slaves were given a choice. In
Bailey, the bequest and the choice were tied together in the same clause of the
will-indeed, in the same sentence. In Williams, they were separated, as they had
been in Elder. In one clause, Hannah Coalter directed that her slaves be emancipated
on a specific date, January 1, 1858, and the executors were directed to raise a fund
from her estate to send the slaves to Liberia or any other free state or country where
they might wish to live. 166 In another, later clause she wrote, "[A]nd I further direct,
that if any of my said servants shall prefer to remain in Virginia, instead of accepting
the foregoing provisions, it is my desire that they shall be permitted by my executors
to select among my relations their respective owners." 167 This second clause led the
court to declare the bequest of freedom invalid. Citing Bailey, the court said, "[A]s
there can be no intermediate condition between slavery and freedom in the status of
the negro, so neither can there be an intermediate condition as to civil rights and
capacities."'' 6 8 Judge Moncure, in a strongly worded dissent, wrote that he would
have held the manumission valid and the later clause invalid, as the manumission was
clear and was not made dependent on the slave's choice. 169 He found the case
distinguishable from Bailey in the separation of the two clauses, though he still
thought that case had been wrongly decided.'70
During the nineteenth century, the courts drew an increasingly rigid line between
slavery and freedom. The legal vision of the slave as property and as the antithesis
of a free person in every respect concerning rights and capacities gained in strength,
and one of the few choices open to a slave, that of choosing whether or not to accept
a bequest of freedom, was closed. In some of the earlier cases, when the conflict was
noted, it was resolved in favor of freedom. '7' In later cases, the attempt itself to give
162. Id. at 204 (Moncure. J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 199.
164. Id. at 194.
165. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 394 (1858).
166. Id. at 394.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 397-98.
169. Id. at 408-09.
170. Id. at 416-17. 421.
171. See Parks v. Heweltt. 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 511 (1838), Elder v. Elder. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 271 (1833): Isaac v. West,
27 Va. (6 Rand.) 652 (1828); Fulton v. Shaw. 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 597 (1827).
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slaves such a choice in a will resulted in a denial of their freedom. The law would not
tolerate any suggestion of a status between slavery and freedom, and the courts
increasingly used any such ambiguity to pronounce in favor of slavery. Slavery was
under increasing attack, and the structure of the slave system might have been in
danger of disintegrating, but the concept of slavery held by Virginia judges was, if
anything, more rigid than ever.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There was a tension between the idea of the slave as a human being and the idea
of the slave as property in the civil law of Virginia, but the categories were not
mutually exclusive. Sometimes the recognition of the slave as a human being
conflicted with his classification as property; in those cases his humanity did not
receive recognition in the eyes of the law. In other cases, the slave's special qualities
as a human being were what made him such valuable property. Then the law waxed
eloquent on the subject of the slave's humanity. Any suggestion of civil rights for the
slave was rejected because those rights would have endowed him with legal capacities
that could readily have come into conflict with his owner's property rights. The law
would recognize in the slave nothing capable of "invading the right of property."'172
The opposition between the status of a slave and the status of a free person was
also an important one in Virginia civil law, and, in this case, the categories were
mutually exclusive. Moreover, there was no status in between; a person had to be one
or the other. Free blacks had a legal position inferior to that of free whites, but they
were another kind of being from slaves.' 73 To be freed was to become a "new
creature," to receive a "new existence," with rights to liberty and property.' 74
Within such a rigid system of statuses, there was still some room to recognize
the slave as a human being. We have shown that the slave's human nature was
recognized when it enhanced his value as property, enabled his owner to use him
more effectively, or protected his owner from liability. It was also recognized when,
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, courts allowed slaves to choose
whether or not to accept a bequest of freedom under a will that offered them the
choice. In such cases the boundary line between statuses remained firm. Slaves were
merely recognized as creatures with a human capacity to express a preference on this
important question.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the courts refused to allow slaves the choice,
saying that to do so conferred on them a legal capacity to free themselves. The decision
was not easily predictable in terms of past Virginia slave law. On the one hand,
allowing the slave the choice did not interfere with the rights of property, except for
the rights of the heirs, who took by default if the bequest of freedom were declared
invalid. The courts had regularly refused to recognize the humanity of the slave when
172. Allen v. Freeland, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 170. 178 (1825).
173. The law relating to free Blacks in pre-Civil War Virginia is discussed in a manuscript in progress by A.L.
Higginbotham, Jr. and G. Bosworth.
174. Fulton v. Shaw, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 597, 599 (1827).
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it interfered with the owner's property rights. On the other hand, allowing the slave
to choose did not benefit the owner, as happened in other contexts in which the slave's
humanity was recognized, such as agency and specific performance. Or, rather, it
benefited him only in the sense that it carried out his wishes as a testator. It conferred
no advantage.
The cases offering the slave the choice of slavery in Virginia or freedom
elsewhere thus fell into neither of the two categories described in this Article: cases
in which the slave's humanity was recognized because to do so conferred a benefit on
the owner and cases in which the slave's humanity was not recognized because to
recognize it would have invaded the owner's rights of property.
The will that offered the slave a choice recognized his humanity in a way that
conferred an advantage on him, not on his master. Still, it did not invade the rights
of property. In line with the logic of past cases, the courts could have gone either
way, and they did. Initially, they construed such wills in favor of freedom and either
allowed the choice or freed the slaves without allowing a choice. By mid-nineteenth
century, they held such bequests invalid, thus ruling in favor of slavery.
On the eve of the Civil War, the Virginia Court of Appeals was unwilling to
follow the dictum of Allen v. Freeland, which recognized that slaves were rational
beings, "entitled to the humanity of the Court when it can be exercised without
invading the right of property." 75 Instead, the court drew back from recognizing the
slave's human nature in a way that was not directly beneficial to his owner.
The human nature of the slave had never had, in the eyes of the law, the same
existential quality as did the human nature of a free person. The inalienable rights that
in principle belonged to all human beings were not extended to slaves. Slaves were,
it seems, not unqualified human beings, but only human beings when it suited the
interests of their masters, or at best when it did not conflict with those interests. The
self-evident truths regarding human equality and rights proclaimed in the Declaration
of Independence were not self-evident when applied to slaves. Indeed, they did not
apply to slaves at all. Nor did the Virginia Bill of Rights, which declared that "all
men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights." 176
In human terms, the judges obviously recognized that slaves were human beings and
marked that recognition with rhetorical flourishes on occasions when the legal
recognition of the slave as a person caused no offense to the slave system. But that
recognition fell by the wayside whenever it was likely to cause inconvenience or loss
to slave owners or when it was thought to challenge the slave system. What legal
recognition there was of the human nature of the slave served to support slavery and
to make it more profitable and advantageous to the slave owners.
In reflecting on the slavery jurisprudence discussed in this Article, some readers
might question its relevance to the America of today. After all, slavery was abolished
well over a hundred years ago (in 1863 by the Emancipation Proclamation and in
175. Allen v. Freeland. 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 170. 178 (1825).
176. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 103 (H.S. Commager 8th ed. 1968).
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1865 by the Thirteenth Amendment), and in one sense the laws we have been
discussing are archaic.
In another sense, however, the material we have used is wholly contemporary,
not in the specific content of the laws, but in the process it illustrates.
A legislature and an activist judiciary, primarily concerned with protecting
property interests, recognized the human needs, aspirations, and suffering of the most
powerless people in the society, the slaves, only when to do so served the interests
of powerful whites like themselves. When such recognition ran contrary to those
interests, they withdrew their human sympathies and turned to discussing the
importance of property rights, economic hardship to vested interests, and settled rules
of law, which they claimed even a court of equity could not overturn.
The judges and legislators turned a selective blind eye to the plight of the most
powerless victims of their society. In some ways this seems almost as bad as not
recognizing the slaves' humanity at all, for it shows that those in power made a
calculation, even though it may at times have been an unconscious one, that some
human beings were not worth protecting against vested interests.
That process is one we must even now watch for and guard against. To what
extent do judges, legislators, and those in the executive branch of government today
engage in such calculations when it comes to protecting the most powerless people in
our society? To what extent do we go along with their judgments?
Because those in power in the past, particularly the judges, used their discretion
to ignore the claims of humanity and to increase the harshness of racial oppression
under slavery, is it not legitimate for us to question the ability and will of today's
society, as reflected in our government, to be fair and just to the powerless of our
society: women, children, the aged, the mentally impaired, the homeless, people of
different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and others suffering severe economic
deprivation? Just as we judge the slave masters of the past, future generations will
evaluate our actions. Will they conclude that those in power today are insensitive to
the helpless victims of our generation, just as were many leaders to the plight of
slaves in earlier periods of our nation's existence? That will surely be the judgment
of the future unless we make certain that the rights of property are subordinate to the
rights of humanity.
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